4 relationships was quickly evidenced in the area of public procurement (or government contracts), probably due to the politically-charged use of public contracts for protectionist purposes to which both the UK and the EU can feel tempted. 6 Indeed, Brexit could largely undo the work of over forty years in creating a single procurement market, where Member States are not allowed to favour their domestic suppliers for goods, services and works. 7 Under EU public procurement law, 8 Member States 6 For example, concerning the procurement of advisory services for the UK government, see A Sanchez-Graells, '"Buy Brexit"? Using "cultural fit" as evaluation criteria breaches EU and UK public procurement law', PolicyBristol blog, 2 March 2017, available at https://policybristol.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2017/03/02/buy-brexitusing-cultural-fit-as-evaluation-criteria-breaches-eu-and-uk-public-procurement-law/. On the other side, on eg a potentially too-strict approach to pre-award screening of access to procurement contracts with a duration cannot discriminate between economic operators on grounds of nationality, either directly or indirectly (eg by imposing contractual requirements that result in de facto discrimination). 9 This simple principle would be threatened if, in the context of Brexit, the UK and the EU re-erected barriers in procurement markets as part of the unravelling of their trade relationships. In 2015, the UK's public procurement market was valued at over £260 billion, and the total public procurement market in the EU was worth £1.5 trillion. 10 Thus, a deterioration of the reciprocal EU-UK access to procurement markets could have significant negative economic impacts.
Given the legal uncertainty and economic instability generated by the activation of Article 50 TEU, this soon led to intense negotiations of a withdrawal agreement between the UK and the EU, January 2018 and quickly involved the explicit recognition of the need for a transition period to avoid the legal uncertainties and potentially very damaging economic impacts of a 'cliff-edge' disconnection of the two legal systems. 13 A draft agreement on a transition period was published on 19 March 2018, 14 in which the EU and the UK reached provisional agreement on a large number (but not all) of the issues relevant for its implementation. Some of the open issues were further agreed in an updated version of the draft transition agreement published on 19 June 2018 (the DTA), 15 and the EU and the UK continue negotiating at the time of writing (August 2018).
If finally agreed, the DTA will establish a transition period to run (at least) until 31 December 2020, which will provide a longer timescale for the Brexit disconnection, as well as some clarity on the process of disentanglement of the UK's and EU's legal systems. The DTA provides explicit rules on public procurement 16 other WTO GPA members, and that these could take time to complete. Thus, it is as yet unclear whether it will be possible to reach a legal position that avoids disruption of international supply chains in UK (and to some extent EU) public procurement markets from 1 January 2021-and any such position will largely hinge on the EU-UK agreement, not only of the DTA, but also of a framework for the future EU-UK trade relationship.
With these complexities as background, the main goal of this paper is to assess the progress achieved to date in the re-regulation of post-Brexit procurement-related trade, and to map the issues that require further work in the run up to 'effective Brexit' on 1 January 2021. To do so, this paper critically assesses the implications for public procurement of the March 2018 DTA, as updated in June 2018. In particular, the paper identifies three shortcomings that would have required explicit regulation: first, the exclusion from the scope of coverage of the DTA of procurement carried out by the EU Institutions themselves; second, the continued enforcement of the rules on contract modification and termination; and third, the interaction between procurement and other rules (section 2). The paper also flags up some of the areas for future EU-UK collaboration that require attention beyond the hints that can be extracted from the DTA (section 3). The paper then goes on to revisit the continued uncertainty concerning the EU's and UK's position within the WTO GPA (section 4). It concludes that it is in both the UK's and the EU's interest to reach a future EU-UK FTA that ensures continued collaboration and crystallises current compliance with EU rules, and to build on it to reach a jointly negotiated solution vis-a-vis the rest of WTO GPA parties (section 5 33 Transposition is necessary, given that EU procurement law takes the form of Directives (n 8). As per general requirements of EU law, of course, the transposition is subject to the principles of direct effect and the duty of consistent interpretation, so any discrepancy between the domestic transposition and the EU rules needs to be resolved in a way that ensures the effectiveness of EU public procurement law. 13 their complexity, they can easily go up to almost a year), establishing transitional rules requires considering this temporal dimension of procurement transactions.
In order to regulate the 'disconnection' of UK procurement from EU rules and the readjustment of UK access to EU procurement markets, the DTA concentrates on on-going procurement procedures at the time of Brexit and aims for a phased disapplication of EU law to public procurement carried out by the UK authorities after that date, as well as a phased exclusion of UK tenderers from within the pool of beneficiaries of market access under the EU public procurement rules (subject to the application of the principle of non-discrimination, as discussed below). In order to establish operational rules, the DTA defines the scope of EU public procurement law for its own purposes (Art 71) and sets out rules applicable to ongoing procedures (Art 72), enforcement procedures (Art 73) and selected issues of continued cooperation (Art 74). This section critically assesses the procurement Title of the DTA, both in terms of the explicit rules it contains (2.1) and some shortcomings that can create legal difficulties during the transition period and beyond (2.2).
What the DTA covers: aiming for business as usual
First and foremost, the DTA aims to ensure the continued application of substantive EU public procurement law, including the requirements derived from general principles. To that effect, Art 71 DTA defines the "relevant rules" to which the transition agreement will apply. Notably, these cover contracts". This is important because Art 72 DTA establishes the continued application of the "relevant rules" to ongoing procedures (in the terms discussed below), which arguably creates an explicit legal basis for the continued effectiveness of general principles of EU public procurement law regarding 'contracts of a certain cross-border interest' not otherwise covered by the EU procurement directives. 38 It is not irrelevant that the DTA refers to the application of EU public procurement law 39 and not to its transposition in the UK, 40 of the EU rules to a given procedure is its launch before the end of the transition period, and that application remains unaffected by the expiry of the transition period, carrying through to the end of the procedure.
Framework agreements 44 are also covered by Art 72 DTA under the same principle of 'initially subject, always subject' to the "relevant rules". Art 72(1)(b) DTA establishes special rules for the award of contracts within framework agreements (ie relating to their performance), whereby EU rules will not only apply to framework agreements concluded before the end of the transition period that, as of that date, have neither expired nor been terminated (ie 'live' framework agreements), but also to framework agreements concluded after the end of the transition period as a result of a procedure covered by Art 72(1)(a) DTA (ie 'launched' framework agreements). Given that the maximum duration of a framework agreement should not ordinarily exceed four years, 45 and the principle of 'initially subject, always subject', this could potentially require continued compliance with EU public procurement law for four years post-Brexit in relation to the call-offs within launched framework agreements. Of course, this could generate some strategic behaviour from contracting authorities or entities towards the end of the transition period (eg withholding of calls for tenders for new framework agreements close to the end of the transition period or early termination of existing framework agreements 'for convenience' after that date), but this seems difficult to avoid through legal rules-other than through the general anti-circumvention provisions of the "relevant rules" 44 A framework agreement means an agreement between one or more contracting authorities and one or more economic operators, the purpose of which is to establish the terms governing future contracts to be awarded during a given period, in particular with regard to price and, where appropriate, the quantity envisaged. The award of contracts within a framework agreement (or call-offs) can be either in the terms specified in the framework agreement itself, or in the terms that result from a 'mini-competition'. See Art 33 Dir 2014/24/EU.
themselves. 46 This triggers the same issues of on-going monitoring of the potential modification and termination of contracts discussed below (see section 2.2).
Given the importance of launch and finalisation dates for the operationalisation of the 'initially subject, always subject' principle, it is not surprising that these are regulated in Art 72 DTA. Articles 72(3) and (4) establish explicit rules depending on whether notices and other transparency requirements are required by the "relevant rules". 47 Where such notices are required, Art 72(3) DTA deems a procedure launched when a call for competition or any other invitation to submit applications has been made in accordance with the "relevant rules", and Art 72(4) considers the procedure finalised upon publication of a contract award notice in accordance with the "relevant rules". This is a rather straightforward if formalistic approach that does not seem to leave scope for doubt or misinterpretation. Where a contract notice is not required under the "relevant rules", Art 72(3) DTA considers the procedure launched when the contracting authority has contacted economic operators in relation to that contract opportunity. In turn, where the "relevant rules" do not require the publication of a contract award notice, Art 72(4)(a) DTA deems a procedure finalised upon conclusion of the relevant contract. This aims to provide a practical trigger for the applicability of EU rules to these less than fully transparent procedures, which can however raise practical difficulties (as discussed below). In addition to these rules, and of high potential practical relevance in view of the 46 Eg Art 5 Dir 2014/24/EU; reg 5 PCR2015.
47 EU procurement law imposes a variety of transparency requirements to promote competition for public contracts and to facilitate the enforcement of tenderers' rights. The most important transparency requirements are structured around notices to advertise contract opportunities and to call for competition (contract notices and, in some case, prior information notices) and notices to advertise the result of procurement procedures (contract award notices). Some types of contracts (eg those directly awarded on the basis of technical or legal exclusivity) do not require the publication of notices. Where required, the relevant notices need to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union, through the specialised Tenders Electronic Daily (TED). This is regulated in detail, eg Arts 48 to 52 Dir 2014/24/EU. TED is accessible at https://ted.europa.eu/.
18 risk of strategic behaviour close to the date of 'effective Brexit' identified above, Art 72(4)(b) DTA also includes a provision concerning cancelled or abandoned procurement procedures. These will be considered finalised upon informing tenderers or, according to the "relevant rules", persons entitled to otherwise submit applications, of the reasons why the contract was not awarded. 48 This approach of course generates the practical difficulty of potential direct awards in breach of the "relevant rules", as well as the difficulties in the simple de facto abandonment of an ongoing procurement procedure.
In that regard, the DTA rules are no better or worse than the general EU procurement rules-which reduction of procurement-related red tape; in particular concerning the procurement-specific database e-Certis. 51 This cooperation is achieved in terms that go beyond the restrictive general collaboration and access to databases defined under Art 7 DTA. This general provision establishes that at the end of the transition period, the UK shall cease to be entitled to access any network, any information system, and any database established on the basis of EU law and imposes on the UK an obligation to take appropriate measures to ensure that it does not access a network, information system, or database which it is no longer entitled to access. By way of derogation from that general 52 The ESPD is a self-declaration form used in public procurement procedures by public buyers and businesses in the EU. Before the introduction of the ESPD, companies were required to submit various documents to prove that they fulfil the exclusion and selection criteria of a tender, for example have paid taxes and have not been convicted of criminal activity. Now, companies are able to meet these obligations with a single ESPD selfdeclaration form. The actual documents will only have to be provided by the winner of the tender. This is 20
Commission. 53 This is intended as a temporary tool while Member States develop their own national approaches, 54 but it remains available for any contracting authority in the meanwhile. As such, regarding UK based contracting authorities, access to the service will remain theoretically available for the 9-month window after the end of the transition period during which they are obliged to continue relying on e-Certis.
This is important for two reasons. First, it violates the principle of 'initially subject, always subject' to the "relevant rules". In procedures ongoing beyond the 9-month window of post-Brexit access, it will no longer be possible for UK contracting authorities to use the e-Certis database. This may raise practical issues in terms of information available for the qualification of tenderers. Second, it can potentially impose an asymmetrical burden on UK and EU tenderers, given that EU-based contracting authorities will permanently be under an obligation to have recourse to e-Certis (at least for procurement covered by Directive 2014/24/EU), but only in favour of tenderers from the EU Member States, which the UK will be no longer. Thus, even if EU-based contracting authorities were willing to unilaterally continue to rely on e-Certis for documentation concerning UK-based tenderers participation in eCertis as a provider of inputs can be extended beyond Brexit day on the basis of the duty of good faith (Art 4a DTA) or, more generally, for simple practical purposes-as it will be in the UK's interest not to jeopardise the chances of success of UK tenderers in on-going EU business opportunities. However, this is not necessarily a straightforward interpretation of the provision. In our view, the DTA should have foreseen a more active involvement in the UK with e-Certis as a whole, rather than solely as a user of the database.
What the DTA does not cover: clear as mud?
As much as the DTA rules on public procurement go a long way in ensuring maintenance of the status quo during the transition period and a smooth phasing out of compliance with EU law, they also fall short on three aspects that would have required explicit regulation: first, the scope of coverage of the DTA in relation to procurement carried out by the EU Institutions themselves; second, the continued enforcement of the rules on contract modification and termination; and third, the interaction between procurement and other rules.
Perhaps surprisingly, one of the aspects of EU-covered procurement that the DTA seemingly fails to address is the regulation of public procurement carried out by the EU Institutions themselves under their specific rules. 55 It is important to stress that the Financial Regulation (Arts 119 and 120)
only imposes an obligation to admit the participation on non-discriminatory grounds by economic 
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operators covered by the EU Treaties (ie from the Member States), or from third countries with which the EU has a free trade agreement covering procurement, including the WTO GPA (see below, section 4). 56 Importantly, on Brexit day and for the duration of the transition period, UK-based economic operators will not be directly covered by either of these rules, 57 or at least not in a straightforward manner.
In our opinion, the DTA does not create an explicit obligation for the EU Institutions to continue treating UK-based tenderers and candidates willing to participate in their procurement procedures in a non-discriminatory manner during the transition period. This is so because, even if the procurement rules of the Financial Regulation and its Implementing Regulation 58 could be considered 
26
Arts 72 and 73 of Directive 2014/24/EU applying as they are seems slim and, in that regard, the DTA could also have been more explicit. It could be that the EU and the UK wanted to limit the DTA to the procurement process and willingly avoided any issues of contract execution that could generate legal disputes well beyond the cut-off date of the end of the transition period. In that case, more clarity would have been preferable to the current uncertainty. Conversely, it could be that it was assumed that the rules on contract modification and termination were considered covered by the definition of "relevant rules" in Art 71 DTA and engaged by the fact that the relevant procurement procedure was subjected to those rules in the tendering phase, but this is by no means a straightforward reading of Art 72 DPA. Thus, also in this case, more clarity would have been welcome.
Finally, a third aspect that is rather unclear in the DTA rules on procurement concerns its interaction with other sets of rules. In particular, the uncertainty comes from the mention in Art 72(5)
DTA that that article "shall not affect Union or United Kingdom rules on customs, movement of goods, provision of services, recognition of professional qualifications or intellectual property". Exactly how
public procurement rules aimed at resolving the practicalities of ongoing tender procedures during the transition period could affect those other sets of rules is less than clear. One possibility would be that, were the EU and the UK to agree on transition rules that deviated from status quo rules in any of those fields, and given that EU procurement law is designed to work in a coordinated manner with current EU law, the purpose of Art 72(5) DPA would be to ensure that the rules in the DPA rather than those in pre-transition EU (and UK) law are applied in a procurement context. However, this is not necessarily apparent from Art 72(5), as it does not refer to rules on those issues in other titles or chapters of the DPA, but rather to rules on other issues under EU and UK law. Thus, some other explanation of the need for Art 72(5) DPA may be necessary, but it is difficult for us to find one. We could speculate on whether the provision aims to limit the possibility for procurement rules (or, rectius, their enforcement) to act as a lever to force market opening beyond explicit pre-transition EU and UK law in other areas. 65 However, such an approach would not hold water because the interpretation of EU public procurement law is ultimately the exclusive competence of the Court of Justice and a provision such as Art 72(5) DPA would most likely reveal itself inoperative in trying to reign in a pro-integrative interpretation of EU public procurement by the Court-either in the context of a dispute involving the UK or not, 66 provided that the ruling by the Court of Justice had to be taken into account for the purposes of enforcing the "relevant rules" during the transition period. On the whole, thus, Art 72(5) DTA seems largely redundant and we wonder if its inclusion may be creating more doubts than it aimed to avoid.
Post-Brexit 'Internal' EU-UK Procurement: Priorities & Challenges
After having assessed the procurement rules of the DTA in the previous section, we now move to the unresolved issues concerning the future EU-UK relationship. Part of the difficulties with the rules in the DTA implicitly derive from the fact that they seem to assume a 'transition into the void'. Their design is such as to establish an absolute cut-off date 67 after which EU-UK trade in procurement becomes unregulated. Of course, this logic makes sense in the context of the sequenced negotiations that ensue from Art 50 TEU. However, in case the EU and the UK reach a trade agreement that regulates their future trade relationships and includes procurement (a future 'EU-UK FTA'), a reform of the DTA may be necessary to ensure transition into the procurement rules of such agreement, rather than into the void-or, in different terms, to avoid the need for 'two consecutive transitions'.
In that regard, addressing the specific issues identified above (see section 2.2) may be desirable (eg to avoid uncertainty as to the applicability of constraints on contract modification or termination for contracts awarded under different transitory regimes). In this section, we concentrate on the analysis of other areas that require careful consideration in the context of designing the future regime for EU-UK trade in public procurement: substantive convergence in EU-UK regulation of procurement (3.1), transparency of procurement opportunities (3.2), mutual recognition of standards and use of common technical specifications (3.3), administrative cooperation stricto sensu (3.4), cross-border procurement cooperation (3.5), remedies (3.6) and the instrumentalization of procurement (3.7).
Unavoidably, some of these issues are interdependent with the EU's and the UK's future position within the WTO GPA (discussed below, section 4), which can predetermine a regulatory baseline that limits the possibilities of future changes-in particular in the direction of de-regulation of procurement. 68 However, in this section, we discuss those issues on the assumption that they are compatible with the EU's and UK's WTO GPA position because they are included in the context of what could be termed a GPA plus agreement that generates no issues of incompatibility with strict WTO GPA obligations. 69 It is also worth noting that some of the issues discussed here concern the 68 As discussed in detail in our previous piece (n 11). As mentioned above (section 1), we acknowledge that, as things stand, an agreement on a future EU-UK FTA (or its main characteristics) may be necessary in order to complete the UK's WTO GPA accession and the adjustment of the EU's schedules, which already creates a 'chicken and egg' problem. However, for the purposes of keeping some order in our analysis, we decided to complete the analysis of 'internal' procurement before proceeding to assess 'external' procurement issues below (section 4).
interaction of procurement rules with (potentially) new rules in other areas, such as rules on customs, movement of goods, provision of services, recognition of professional qualifications or intellectual property (see above 2.2 re Art 72(5) DTA). This can create a series of 'chicken and egg problems' to the extent that the retention or development of rules on eg recognition of standards for the purposes of procurement 70 may need to be dependent on more general rules on recognition of standards, whereas the latter may not exist depending on the 'intensity' of the free trade agreement reached by the EU and the UK in areas other than procurement. While acknowledging this, the discussion in this section will not take into account implications beyond the area of public procurement.
Substantive convergence in EU-UK regulation of procurement
One of the counter-intuitive aspects of discussing a future EU-UK FTA covering procurement concerns the extent to which it will be able to ensure substantive convergence in the regulation of procurement in the EU and the UK. As is obvious, given the UK's transposition of the 2014 EU public procurement package and, more generally, the full application of the "relevant rules" during the transition period 76 It is worth keeping in mind that this approach was adopted by the Junker Commission, which will end its mandate in Nov 2019-ie a full year before the transition ends, or even longer before that in case of any in relevant changes in EU procurement law in action, and this is where regulatory convergence may well need to concentrate.
Transparency of procurement opportunities
A second important aspect concerns the transparency of procurement opportunities, which goes beyond the relatively simple issue of ensuring on-line publication of contract notices or equivalent future business opportunity notices in a website in a language of common use in international trade 
Mutual recognition of standards and use of common technical specifications
Similar issues of compatibility and mutual recognition arise concerning the use of a common approach to technical standards and specifications. The relevance of neutrality and transparency in the setting of technical specifications in the context of competitive procurement can hardly be overstated.
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However, it is also clear that this is not an issue of exclusive relevance in the field of public procurement, but rather more generally one of the key issues in ensuring continued 'frictionless trade' due to the importance of standardisation as a mechanism to prevent non-tariff barriers to free trade. Whether a future EU-UK FTA will include significant rules on harmonisation or mutual recognition of technical standards is beyond the scope of our discussion. However, suffice it to stress here that any deviation from the current rules to the effect of allowing for the existence of parallel EU and UK standards can create a significant administrative burden in the context of public procurement, both for contracting authorities and tenderers.
Administrative cooperation
The need for continued administrative cooperation has probably already emerged from the previous discussion (re substantive convergence, transparency and joint development or mutual recognition of standards), and this can only be emphasised by focusing on administrative collaboration stricto sensu for the running of procurement procedures.
One of the areas of particularly intense (and long-lasting) commitments in the DTA concerns the continued use of e-Certis (and implicitly, of the ESPD and its temporary centralised support through the European Commission's electronic service) by the UK for a period of 9 months exceeding the end of the transition period (see above 2.1). This can only be seen as a recognition of the relevance of the system of self-certification backed up by administrative collaboration in the upkeep of a common database of documents relevant for the exclusion and qualitative selection of candidates and tenderers in public procurement procedures covered by current EU and UK rules. The disconnection of the UK from the e-Certis database so quickly after the end of the transition will affect contracting authorities in the UK and the rest of the EU. As for the first, they will not be able to rely on the e-Certis system beyond the 9-month window even for procedures that are already ongoing. As for the latter, if they have UK-based tenderers participating in a procedure that is on-going at the end of the transition period, they will not be able to rely on access to such tenderers' documentation via the eand technical regulations for goods, 1 December 2017, available at https://www.marknadskontroll.se/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/Brexitrapport-ENG-180201.pdf.
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Canada. 113 As with the previous scenario, a full accession would be required but with added scope for uncertainty, risk and delays arising from the negotiations.
When the authors first considered the three scenarios, 114 it was apparent the first was the most straightforward of the three. In the meanwhile, the situation has not changed significantly in terms of the relative desirability of each option, but in practical terms the absolute complexity of the first scenario has increased, in particular in view of the initial reaction of the WTO government procurement committee. Therefore, option 1 is no longer as straightforward as it could have been as other WTO GPA signatories seem willing to use this opportunity to extract additional concessions.
There is a risk as time goes on that more current WTO GPA members will take the opportunity to force a deeper renegotiation with the UK and/or the EU, especially if concessions are made in the meantime.
However, staying as close as possible to this pathway and seeking a jointly negotiated solution vis-avis the rest of WTO GPA parties may still be the most direct pathway towards UK's access and EU's repositioning within the agreement in the least disruptive manner.
If, on the other hand, the UK tries to deviate from the status quo, the more likely it is that the accession will end up looking as a fresh accession implying long and protracted negotiations with the other WTO GPA parties. This could potentially become a stumbling block in the negotiations with the EU and consolidate the current position that, in the absence of an EU-UK FTA covering procurement and given the non-existence of a 'WTO rules' default position regulating trade through procurement between the UK and third countries, Brexit implies a transition into the void in terms of regulation of international trade in public procurement markets. 
Conclusion
In the context of a broader critical assessment of the procurement rules in the 2018 DTA agreed in principle by the EU and the UK, this paper has stressed how the DTA is currently aimed at ensuring a cut-off point where EU-UK procurement would become unregulated, and how this can be problematic in the context of the likely need to transition into an alternative regulatory scenario of a future EU-UK FTA covering procurement. In order to avoid 'two consecutive transitions', it seems preferable to ensure the conclusion of the EU-UK FTA within the period of transition covered by the DTA, to amend the latter agreement, and to ensure smooth transition into the future EU-UK FTA.
The paper has also flagged up areas where retaining collaboration and substantive convergence will be determinant of the effectiveness of the procurement function and to retain the economic advantages of 'frictionless trade' in public procurement markets between the EU and the UK. The analysis has shown how it is in the interest of the UK and the EU to seek to crystallise the status quo and to ensure continued compliance with a single set of standards going forward. The disruption that could derive from the absence of an EU-UK FTA covering these areas-either temporarily, or permanently-would imply a significant loss of the economic advantages gained with the creation of the internal market for public procurement.
The value of a joint EU-UK approach has been further emphasised in the context of the UK's need to seek fresh accession to the WTO GPA and in the EU's vested interest in facilitating this process in order to minimise the disruption of its own access to WTO GPA procurement markets, as well as to avoid or minimise the need for further concessions to other WTO GPA signatories in terms of coverage under the relevant schedules. Therefore, on the whole, we cannot but conclude that it is in both the UK's and the EU's interest to reach a future EU-UK FTA that ensures continued collaboration and crystallises current compliance with EU rules, and to build on it to reach a jointly negotiated solution vis-a-vis the rest of GPA parties.
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In our view, this case study of the post-Brexit re-regulation of procurement-related trade between the EU and the UK, and between these and the wider world, can offer valuable insights in other areas of the future EU-UK relationship. Unsurprisingly, given that the negotiations around Brexit are aimed at damage control or minimisation, it should be expected that the value of preserving the status quo as much as possible and the continuation of existing collaborations will be guiding goals in all areas of reorganisation of EU-UK relationships post-Brexit.
